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Special recognition for the development of this statement must
be accorded the task force that was formed to review the social
security retirement system. The task force was chaired by James
E. Wheeler, CPA, and its members included Donald H. Skadden,
CPA, and B. Kenneth Sanden, CPA.

Introduction
In its fullest sense, “social security” should be viewed as a
comprehensive, lifetime system composed of interrelated parts.
In one way or another, society must protect itself from financial
disasters. It needs and wants financial protection from serious
health problems, debilitating poverty, and loss of income due to
unemployment, disability, or death of the family breadwinner; and
it wishes to provide for retirement income.
Such a total protection plan should be financed by some com
bination of governmental programs, employer programs, private
savings, and insurance plans. In the United States a significant
portion of this total protection is provided by employer- and in
dividually-financed insurance and savings plans. In addition, the
federal, state, and local governments spend billions of dollars an
nually on social protection programs, including (1) welfare (includ
ing aid to dependent children (ADC), food-stamps, low-cost public
housing, supplemental security income (SSI, a guaranteed annual
income plan for low-income persons that is financed by general
revenues), and many other federal and state welfare programs),
(2) unemployment compensation, (3) disability protection,
(4) medicaid and medicare, (5) survivorship protection, and
(6) retirement benefits.1
This statement of tax policy is concerned primarily with the
retirement portion of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA; hereafter, the social security system).

1. For perhaps the most complete discussion of the many facets of our social
security system, see Robert J. Myers, Social Security (Homewood, Ill.: Richard
D. Irwin for McCohan Foundation, 1975).
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Summary of Recommendations
The recommendations of most observers, including the current
administration and Congress, concentrate primarily on the revenue
side of the system and call for constant increases in the payroll tax.
These taxes have already grown faster than the consumer price
index, increasing by more than 840 percent between 1962 and
1981 (as projected). Even with these increases, revenues for 1981
and later will almost certainly be inadequate to support the pro
jected level of outlays. Consequently, unless Congress mandates
new sources of revenue or further increases in social security taxes,
projected benefits must be reduced. Because payroll taxes cannot
continue to rise at this rate, our recommendations focus on the
benefits taxpayers should receive from the system.
If adopted, these suggestions would prevent long-term oper
ating deficits for the retirement portion of the social security system
and would allow for some reduction in social security taxes. In
addition, these suggestions would significantly simplify the system
and make it more equitable.
Briefly, the recommendations are as follows:
1. The present stratified benefit computation should be replaced
by an unstratified payment schedule based on each individual’s
price-level-adjusted total contributions to the retirement sys
tem. An individual’s total contributions would include the re
tirement portion of both employee and employer contributions,
plus a real rate of return. That sum would in turn be adjusted
for price-level changes. This amount would be the basis for the
earned retirement benefit. In order to receive the same re
tirement annuities, self-employed persons should contribute
an amount equal to the total amount contributed by both the
employee and the employer.
This earned computation system would eliminate
• The minimum benefit computation, and thus the problem
of “double dipping. ”
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• The weighting of benefits or a disproportionate return on
different contribution amounts.
These items presently result in retirement benefits in excess
of the amounts that would be received on the basis of pricelevel-adjusted total contributions to the system; thus, they in
effect constitute welfare-type payments.
2. The current pay-as-we-go concept should be retained. There
is no need to create a large, actuarially sound fund with which
to meet obligations; however, the absence of an actuarial in
vestment fund means, in essence, that the government’s gen
eral fund has “borrowed” from the social security fund. Some
subsequent transfers from the general fund to the social se
curity fund are necessary to pay back these borrowed amounts.
The timing of such repayments would be influenced by any or
all of the following phenomena:
• The inclusion of a price-level adjustment in the benefit
calculation.
• The inclusion of a real rate of return in the benefit calculation.
• Dramatic decreases in the ratio of workers to retirees due
either to high unemployment or to significant demographic
changes.
3. As indicated in the foregoing recommendations, total contri
butions used in calculating retirement benefits should be ad
justed periodically to reflect increases in the consumer price
index. This periodic updating for price-level changes would
ensure the relatively constant purchasing power of the benefit
received.
4. The retirement annuity should begin at age 65, unless actu
arially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier age have
been elected, regardless of the participant’s employment sta
tus. If early retirement is permitted, the initial annuity should
be based on contributions up to that retirement date. Wages
after early retirement should be subject to FICA until age 65,
thus requiring an annual recomputation of the retirement
annuity.
Discontinuing the taxation of earnings after age 65 would
eliminate all inequities in the present rules concerning work
after that age. Many persons have difficulty explaining why
individuals who need additional income should be penalized
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(subjected to FICA taxation and loss of social security benefits)
for working, whereas persons with large amounts of investment
income (and thus large equity interests) collect full social se
curity benefits.
5. Settlement options selected at the time of retirement should
permit (1) a joint and survivor annuity (for married persons),
(2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity with a guaranteed
refund feature under which the price-level-adjusted total re
tirement contributions would be guaranteed to either the re
tiree or the estate. If the participant dies before reaching age
65 without a surviving spouse, the total price-level-adjusted
contributions for retirement should be paid to the estate. If
there is a surviving spouse, that person generally should have
the same settlement options that the participant would have
had on reaching retirement age.
This recommendation would eliminate much of the ineq
uity arising under the present system (1) when persons are
taxed and die before retirement age without having eligible
dependents and (2) when one spouse dies after both have con
tributed to the system during working years.
6. For income tax purposes, the retirement portion of the FICA
tax assessed against employees and self-employed persons
should be deductible when it is paid, and retirement benefits
should be taxable when they are received. The employer’s
contribution should continue to be deductible. Because lump
sum distributions (the result either of death before retirement
age or of the guaranteed refund feature) would be subject to
income tax, Congress should consider some form of income
averaging.
7. The foregoing recommendations would increase future social
security retirement benefits for some and decrease them for
others. If any retirees’ incomes should drop below established
minimums, then those persons should be eligible for income
assistance under the supplemental security income (SSI) pro
gram, which is financed by general revenues and is based on
need. For present and near-term retirees, the current level of
scheduled benefits should perhaps be guaranteed without tests
of need, but the excess of the amounts that they receive over
the amounts that they would collect under the earned com
putation plan should come from the SSI program.
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8. Coverage under social security should be made as universal as
possible.
9. If Congress desires to retain the present income tax exclusion
for social security benefits, an exclusion that does not benefit
low-income retirees, then the exclusion should be legislatively
enacted. An exclusion of this magnitude should not be made
by administrative decision only.
The major thrust of these recommendations is that welfare, the
actuarially unearned portion of the benefits from the social security
system, should be transferred to the general revenue budget.
Welfare should be an expenditure out of general revenue, not
payroll tax revenue. Th is would greatly strengthen the social se
curity system and would simplify its structure. The regressive na
ture of the payroll tax would then be justified, for it would be
paying only for earned retirement benefits.
The shift of welfare payments from the social security program
should permit a significant reduction in social security taxes; how
ever, the need for general revenue (primarily from the income tax)
would increase. The tax reduction for social security should exceed
the needed additional income tax revenue because of the imple
mentation of the need test under the SSI program. The entire
social security tax reduction should result in reduced labor costs
and increased economic activity, which could help reduce unem
ployment and infl ation and increase capital formation.
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Questions and Answers
Much of the study leading to these recommendations involved
attempts to answer five basic questions.
1. Is the social security system absolutely necessary?
With about 34.4 million current beneficiaries and with
about 110 million others expecting benefits because of their
current tax payments (in 1978), there can be little doubt that
a federal retirement system is absolutely essential.
2. Is the social security tax regressive?
The financing of social security is highly regressive to mod
erately low- and middle-income wage earners because the tax
is a flat rate based only on a limited amount of earned income.
For very low wage earners in 1980 ($6,527.41 or less) with
dependent children, the refundable earned income credit off
sets the full impact of the FICA tax.2 Thus, for this group, the
effective tax rate is zero and, therefore, not regressive. For
wage earners between $6,527 and $10,000 with dependent
children, the earned income credit offsets a declining portion
of the social security tax; above $10,000 the credit does not
offset any of the tax.
Congress offers an ability-to-pay concept as the rationale
for the “exclusion” of low wage earners ($6,527 and below) with
dependent children from social security taxes.3 This concept,
however, is not applied consistently, since persons who have
high incomes solely from investments are also “excluded” from
the tax.
For persons with large salaries, the effective social security
tax rate decreases as earned income increases. Thus, this tax
is progressive for some very low income wage earners, but it
is normally quite regressive when compared to the tax on the
earnings of an average wage earner.
2. .0665X = 500 - .1 25(X -6,000). X = $6,527.41.
3. U.S., Congress, Senate, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, S. Rep. 1236, pp. 51-52.
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If one views the social security contribution as the purchase
of a retirement plan, then regression should be inevitable,
since regression is the natural result when low-income persons
purchase anything, be it food or a retirement plan. Observers
should realize the regressive nature of the expenditure but
should not criticize the retirement system because of it. To the
extent that the social security tax finances any government
activity other than the individual’s own retirement, it should
be acknowledged to be regressive; but to the extent that an
individual’s social security contribution is limited to the amount
necessary to finance his own retirement, the concept of re
gressivity is irrelevant.
3. Are the retirement benefits of the social security system
progressive?
Yes, they are very progressive, especially for those who
obtain the so-called minimum benefit or who have had very
low earned incomes. For persons who have had all of their
FICA tax refunded through the earned income credit, the effect
is more than progressive; they receive heavily weighted ben
efits based, in part, on wages that were essentially untaxed.
Progression of benefits is one of the things that is wrong
with the system. Retirement benefits should be based on what
a person has paid into the system. To the extent that a bene
ficiary receives more than what has been paid for, he is re
ceiving welfare; and welfare payments should not be funded
with a regressive payroll tax. Regressive payroll taxes favor the
upper-income groups, and progressive welfare benefits favor
the low-income groups, with middle-income wage earners and
self-employed persons supplying the benefits.
4. What percentage of an individual’s retirement income should
social security provide?
The retirement benefits should be whatever amount has
been “paid for” by prior tax payments, but the amount should
not be so large that it eliminates the need for private savings.
The exact percentage of necessary retirement income that
should be supplied by social security is difficult to determine;
it should, however, provide a floor of protection for those with
normal working lifetimes and average wages.
5. Should general tax revenues be used to supplement the social
security system?
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If the system actually were a retirement system, as most
people have been led to believe, the answer would be a re
sounding No. General revenue should not be used to supple
ment retirement system revenues; however, our present social
security system includes a substantial element of welfare that
should be removed entirely from the social security system and
shifted to the supplemental security income (SSI) program,
which is purely a welfare program funded through general
revenues.
Under our present system, it seems logical that general
funds should be transferred to the social security fund for at
least three reasons, two of which are related to the welfare
element discussed above. First, the benefits are relatively
higher for those at the lower end of the income scale. The
practical effect of this is that two major groups draw benefits
substantially in excess of what their contributions would justify:
(1) those who actually earned at the lower levels through most
or all of their working lifetimes and (2) government employees
who are able to take private-sector jobs just long enough to
qualify for social security benefits at the low-income levels.
Both groups are receiving something that they have not paid
for, which, in essence, is welfare. This welfare element should
be subjected to a need test and should be financed by general
revenue funds, not by the regressive payroll tax.
Second, much of the recent short-run deficit in the system
is due to heavy unemployment, and this affects intergenera
tional transfers under the pay-as-we-go system. The effects of
excessive unemployment should not result in increased tax
rates in the retirement portion of the social security system.
When this happens, the labor sector is hit twice—once by
unemployment and then by increased social security taxes.
Again, it would be preferable to make the social security
system truly a retirement system. In this case, an unemployed
worker who did not contribute to social security would not
receive credit for the period of unemployment. If a worker
suffered such severe unemployment that his earned retirement
benefits fell below some minimum standard, he would be el
igible for a welfare payment that would come from general
funds. Alternatively, if unemployed workers were given credit
for their periods of unemployment, then the general fund
should, in essence, make their contributions for them during
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the period of unemployment. It would be possible to establish
a normal rate of contributions for unemployed persons. It
would also be possible to designate a reasonable rate of un
employment, in which case the general fund would need to
make contributions to the social security fund only during pe
riods of excessive or prolonged unemployment.
Third, because social security taxes paid by individuals are
not deductible, the income taxes paid on the employees’ and
self-employed persons’ social security contributions are a form
of double taxation . Thus, in a very real sense, the social security
system is contributing to the general fund substantial amounts
that should be made available to the system itself The amount
of such double taxation is very difficult to measure. The earned
income credit is a direct offset to the double taxation, but, even
beyond that, it is quite difficult to know to what degree Con
gress modified income tax rates because of the rapid increase
in social security taxes.
A much better alternative would be for the social security
system to be taxed in the same way as qualified pension plans.
This would require taxation of social security benefits and de
ductibility of social security taxes. Because of the impact of the
zero bracket amount and the double personal exemptions after
age 65, taxability of benefits would not reduce the income of
any individual whose only income after retirement comes from
social security benefits.
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Problems Requiring Further
Research
No benefit percentage is specified in our recommendations.
Instead, we state that benefits should relate to price-level-adjusted
total contributions. This would require, in effect, a breakdown of
the contributions in order to determine how much would be for
retirement and survivorship as opposed to disability. This would
be an extensive actuarial undertaking and could perhaps be done
best by the social security administration. The appendix shows
several examples of the computation of price-level-adjusted total
contributions.
Logically, social security retirement benefits should reduce an
individual’s desire for personal savings, and both of these—social
security benefits and personal savings—should have an impact on
the need for welfare such as SSI. The benefits from social security
should be high enough to be attractive to groups of federal, state,
and local employees and yet not so large that they eliminate the
need for personal savings, including private retirement plans. This,
too, is a function of the amount of the contribution. Thus, if the
welfare aspects of the present social security system were shifted
to the SSI program, perhaps the payroll tax rate could be signifi
cantly reduced. This should increase personal savings and thus
stimulate capital formation.
In addition, in certain situations, capital can be substituted for
labor; with social security taxes increasing faster than the cost of
living, the effect on employment is detrimental. An inability to
substitute capital for labor may be particularly onerous to certain
sectors of the economy, such as nonprofit entities, including state
and local governments.
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A Review of the System
The remainder of this statement of tax policy reviews some of
the basic characteristics of the retirement portion of social security,
analyzes some of the financing problems confronting the system,
and develops some recommendations for change.
The present social security system affects most Americans at
some point in their lifetimes.
The number of persons receiving monthly benefits under the OASDI
[old-age, survivors, and disability insurance] program totaled 34.4
million at [the end of] September 1978. An estimated 110 million
workers had earnings in calendar year 1978 that were taxable and
creditable toward [their] benefits under the program.4

In addition to the millions of workers, several million employers
also paid social security taxes. The figures in the foregoing quotation
indicate that there are currently about three workers for each ben
eficiary receiving old-age, survivor, or disability benefits. Accord
ing to some estimates, by the year 2050 this ratio may decrease
to a point where the number of retirees could approach the number
of covered workers. In 1976 the chief actuary of the U.S. Social
Security Administration commented as follows:
Since 1962 social security taxes have increased faster than the con
sumer price index (CPI) and most recommendations for change call
for increased taxes. Under the current-cost method of financing, the
amount of taxes collected each year is intended to be approximately
equal to the benefits and administrative expenses paid during the
year plus a small additional amount to maintain the trust funds at an
appropriate contingency reserve level. The purpose of the trust funds
4. Board of Trustees, 1979 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Balti
more: Social Security Administration, U.S.D.H.E.W ., 1979), p. 4.
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under current-cost financing is to reflect all financial transactions and
to absorb temporary differences between income and expenditures.5

The desired size of the contingency reserve was recently re
duced from approximately 100 percent of the annual expenditures
to 50 percent, and one Carter administration proposal would have
reduced the desired reserve to about 35 percent of one year’s
expenditures, based on the added protection of their recommended
countercyclical device.6 The actual fund balance in 1980 is far below
the desired 50 percent reserve.
In recent years, the social security system has grown enor
mously. In the projected 1981 federal budget, the revenue gen
erated by social security taxes (FICA, medicare, and unemploy
ment) is more than two-and-a-half times the revenue from the
corporate income tax and represents almost one-third of total fed
eral receipts.7 For millions of Americans, social security taxes are
significantly larger than individual income taxes.8 A comparison
between the 1962 federal budget and the projected federal budget
for 1981 shows that social security tax receipts have increased more
than 840 percent.
Even with all of this revenue, the system is currently paying
monthly benefits in excess of monthly revenues and will likely
continue to do so even with the huge increases in the FICA tax.
The 1977 amendments to the social security system, representing
one of the largest tax increases ever imposed, were supposed to
supply enough revenue to make the system sound until the turn
of the century; but with inflation and high unemployment, the
system is still drawing down the fund balance.

5. A. Haeworth Robertson, A Commentary Prepared to Assist in the Reading
and Interpretation of the 1976 Trustees Report, OASDI, and A Commentary
Prepared to Assist in the Reading and Interpretation of the 1977 Annual Reports
of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds (Baltimore: Social
Security Administration, U .S.D.H .E.W ., 1976 and 1977), p. 1 of both documents.
6. “Statement of HEW Secretary Califano on the Administration’s Social Security
Financing Proposal Before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Social Security,”
as reported in the B. N. A. Daily Report fo r Executives (June 13, 1977), p. X-2.
7. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Gov
ernment Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1980), p. 39.
8. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses Budget of the United
States Government Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Print
ing Office, 1980), p. 48.
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The Social Security old-age trust fund is in financial peril once again,
and despite the scheduled boosts in the Social Security tax rate, the
government will have to come up with an additional $15-$25 billion
in revenues over the next few years to keep the fund solvent through
1984.9

In 1966, by contrast, the social security system receipts were
less than the tax yield from the corporate income tax, and the
system was operating with revenues in excess of benefits.
Obviously, total benefits have increased even faster than the
rise in social security taxes, even though the increase in the FICA
taxes has greatly exceeded the increase in the CPI.
From 1937 through calendar year 1976, cumulative income to the
trust funds amounted to $661 billion . . . and cumulative disburse
ments amounted to $620 billion. The balance of $41 billion was held
in the trust funds at the end of calendar year 1976. Based on current
projections (under the intermediate assumptions) it is estimated that,
during the calendar years 1977-81, income to the trust funds will
total $499 billion . . . and disbursements will be $540 billion. This
is a projected decrease in the trust funds of $41 billion during the
period 1977-81.10

With all this change, there had to be some adjustments made; but,
unfortunately, the answer was another tax increase in the Social
Security Amendments of 1977.
The Basic Retirement Package

In its narrowest sense, social security is security for retirement,
even though this is only one part of our old age, survivor, disability,
and health insurance (OASDHI) system. A mandatory, contribu
tory retirement system is not only desirable, it is essential, because
we cannot back out and start anew. Without such a system, millions
of additional low-income elderly persons would be on public wel
fare; for the same reason, it is absolutely necessary that benefits
not be eroded by inflation.

9. B. N. A. Daily Report fo r Executives (January 21, 1980), p. LL-1.
10. Robertson, Commentary to the 1977 Annual Reports of the Social Security
Trust Funds, p. 2.
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Concepts in Financing the Retirement Package

The American public generally has been convinced that this
universal retirement plan should be paid for by the payroll tax.
According to this view, payroll tax payments are somewhat similar
to retirement annuity premiums. Indeed, most persons probably
see this tax as their investment in their own future retirement
benefits; the current acceptance of our very high payroll tax may
well be attributable to the predominance of this view.
Alternatively, the payroll tax can be viewed as just another
source of federal revenue—a flat-rate income tax based solely on
a limited amount of earned income. As just one more source of
federal tax revenue, there would be no need for prior designations
of how these funds should be spent. Certainly, in this view, there
is no need to tie benefits to contributions or even to have separate
funds. The idea of using general income tax revenue to supplement
the payroll tax would not exist because both would be considered
to be sources of general revenue. For example, under this concept,
welfare, defense, or any other payments could be met with the use
of payroll tax revenues. This would remove from social security
any pretense of retirement insurance and would convert the entire
social security system to simply another form of welfare.
It is worthwhile to note that our present retirement system is
really a combination of both concepts, even though they are quite
different. To the extent that the payroll tax is used to augment
general revenues (through hidden welfare expenditures), the
American public is being deceived. In addition, there may be very
serious economic implications.
Characteristics of Retirement Under the Social Security
Plan

The principal characteristics of the federal retirement system
are (1) it is compulsory, (2) it establishes a floor of protection (a
social adequacy concept), (3) it is self-supporting via the payroll
tax, and (4) it is not a means- or need-tested program. There are
some significant exceptions to all of these concepts.
The Com pulsory Coverage Concept

The single most important exception to the compulsory con
tribution concept is the exclusion of federal (and in some cases
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state and local) employees. There is a separate retirement plan for
federal employees (similar in some respects to private retirement
plans), but this is not an adequate reason for the exclusion of
government employees.
It has been observed that in 1969 one-third of social security bene
ficiaries who were also receiving benefits under another governmen
tal plan were receiving minimum benefits.

In fact, it appears to us that there is no valid reason for the exclu
sion, and, therefore, all governmental employees should be
brought into the system. This has implications for both the mini
mum payment and the weighting of benefits, which are discussed
later.
Social security coverage is generally compulsory only if the
individual has wage or self-employment income. Investment in
come, such as dividends or interest, is not taxed to provide for
social security . When a retirement system does not pay any welfare,
this tax exemption is logical because investment income continues
after retirement (unless the principal is consumed), whereas wages
are generally discontinued.
The Social Adequacy (Floor-of-Protection) Concept

Many people believe that society should guarantee every in
dividual a minimum level of health care and a minimum standard
of living. To one degree or another, such a welfare concept is well
ingrained in the political and social structure of the United States
today.
Social adequacy is a welfare objective in which an individual’s benefit
amount is determined, not by his or her contributions, but by
(a) appropriate transfer of income from affluent to needy groups, and
(b) a minimum standard of living beneath which society decides that
no individual should fall. The Social Security Act of 1935 represented
a compromise between equity and social adequacy within a system
that was designed to build at least a part of the actuarial reserve that
would be necessary to fund a comparable privately oriented program.
But amendments to the Act steadily shifted the emphasis more in
11. Myers, Social Security, p. 189.
12. Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional Re
search Service, joint committee print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976), p. 24.
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the direction of social adequacy by weakening the relationship be
tween benefits and contributions. [Emphasis added]13

It is not necessary, nor is it logical, that this minimum “social
adequacy” be provided entirely through the social security retire
ment system. There are a number of ways in which individuals
may provide for their own retirement, including employer pension
plans, Keogh plans, individual retirement accounts, private an
nuities, individual savings accounts, and social security. Most peo
ple have viewed social security from the beginning as a means by
which they are providing for their own retirement; indeed, the
government has taken great pains to promote that notion. If we
do not return to a logical and fiscally responsible relationship be
tween contributions and benefits, the entire social security retire
ment system will lose its credibility. If an individual retiree’s re
tirement income from social security and other plans, if any, is
inadequate, then the income can be supplemented by the variety
of local, state, and federal programs mentioned earlier.
Presently we are attempting to provide a major part of the
minimum social adequacy through the social security retirement
system, via a benefit structure that greatly overweights the benefits
at the low end of the scale. The minimum monthly benefit, which
had increased more rapidly than other social security benefits, has
been frozen at $122 since January 1979.14 To be eligible for the
minimum benefit, an individual must have had one quarter of
covered employment for each year after 1950 that he or she was
between the ages of 21 and 62. Thus, an individual retiring in 1981
at the age of 62 would need 30 quarters of coverage (lesser of 1980
minus 1950 or ages 61 minus 21); workers retiring in 1991 or later
will need only 40 quarters of coverage.15 Thus, if a worker retires
after having earned $260 per quarter (which was the minimum for
one quarter of coverage in 1979; for years prior to 1979 this min

13. Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security, p. 12. It should be noted
that the income transfer is not from the affluent but largely from the middleincome wage earner.
14. Controller General of the United States, Minimum Social Security Benefit:
A Windfall That Should Be Eliminated (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Ac
counting Office), pp. 1-3.
15. Ibid, p. 2. There is a transitional guarantee for those persons retiring between
1979 and 1983: They can use the new or the old formula to maximize their social
security benefits.

16

imum was $50 per quarter) for 40 quarters, and if the FICA tax
rate were .0665 (the 1981 rate) in each quarter, the FICA tax
withheld would total $691.60 ($260 x 40 x .0665) for the ten-year
period. For this amount, this person would be receiving a monthly
minimum benefit of $122, or $1,464 each year of retirement.
Attempting to provide minimum social adequacy through the
social security retirement system creates various social and financial
problems. When welfare is provided through retirement pay
ments, it is not practical to subject it to any sort of need test. The
absence of a means test for the welfare element of social security
causes disproportionately high benefits to be paid to many indi
viduals who have substantial incomes from other sources. Also, it
makes it possible, and often financially attractive, for government
employees to accept covered employment just long enough to qual
ify for the minimum social security benefits.
One of the greatest inequities of combining welfare with social
security is that this portion of federal welfare must be financed
entirely by workers covered by social security, whereas welfare
should be financed from the general revenues. The financial impact
of combining welfare and social security is evidenced by Professor
Wilbur J. Cohen’s testimony that benefits received but not paid
for by the beneficiaries when they were contributors “approximates
about one-third of the long-range costs."16
Thus, we strongly recommend that there be no “minimum
benefit” from the social security retirement system, but that all
benefits be based directly on the individual’s own contributions
to the system and length of employment. If such benefits, plus
retirement income from other sources, are below whatever mini
mum society establishes, the additional benefits should be pro
vided from a general fund welfare program.
Professor Cohen suggested another alternative that would treat
the benefits received from federal, state, or local public retirement
or pension plans, which are supplementary to social security, as
being from social security. Thus, persons covered by such plans
would receive the higher of the two (if only two) plans but not both
(unless they were fully and continuously covered under both
plans).1
7 This would be an improvement in the present system
16. Wilbur J. Cohen, former HEW Secretary, in testimony before the Senate
Finance Subcommittee on Social Security, as reported in the B.N.A. Daily Report
fo r Executives (June 16, 1977), p. J-4.
17. Cohen, B.N.A. Daily Report fo r Executives (June 16, 1977), p. J-3.
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relative to government workers; however, we believe that our plan
corrects many other defects and is, therefore, preferable.
The Self-Supporting Concept

Many persons seek to keep the social security system and the
general revenue system separate. Robert J. Myers, testifying as
a former chief actuary, on February 4, 1976, stated the following:
Finally, let me turn to how the financing problems of the OASDI
system should not be solved. Some people have proposed the solution
of injecting a governmental subsidy from general revenues into
OASDI either directly or else indirectly by moving some of the
Hospital Insurance tax rates to OASDI and then injecting a govern
ment subsidy into HI. This approach should not be followed for a
number of reasons.
Introduction of a government subsidy would dilute the awareness
of the public as to the cost of the program, because many would
believe that somebody other than themselves would be providing
this financing.
In actual fact, the general revenues taxation necessary to produce
the government subsidy would be paid by virtually the same people
who are now paying the payroll taxes—and very likely with not too
great a difference in the actual incidence of the taxes. [Note: Even
if this latter assumption were true, it totally ignores the economic
and political implications.]
The injection of general revenues into the time-tested approach
to the system being wholly self-supporting from payroll taxes would
erode the self-sustaining concept by moving in the direction of a
welfare concept. In turn, this could lead to means testing for benefits.
Any general revenue financing in OASDI would very likely lead to
a lack of stability in the benefit protection provided because of the
pressures of other programs that can only be financed from general
revenues.18
The injection of general revenues into the social security system
has a counterpart that is almost never mentioned—the inclusion
of general fund expenditures (welfare) in social security benefits.
To be consistent, we must oppose the use of social security system
revenues to finance general revenue expenditures (in the form of
welfare) as strongly as we oppose the use of general revenues to
18. Robert J. Myers, Statement on Behalf o f the American Life Insurance As
sociation on the President’s Social Security Proposals Before the Subcommittee
on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, February 4,
1976, pp. 3-4.
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finance the social security system. Welfare programs are rightly
expenditures of general revenues, not payroll taxes. Thus, welfare
expenditures should be removed from the social security system
or paid for by using general revenues within the social security
system. We favor the former.
The social security system is termed “self-supporting,” a con
cept for which there are at least three possible interpretations. At
one extreme would be an actuarially sound, fully funded program
comparable to a commercial annuity. This might be thought of as
self-supporting with respect to each separate annuitant. The fund
ing feature of this program is not necessary, feasible, or even de
sirable for social security: Full funding of social security would
completely upset the entire economy. At the other extreme, the
entire social security system is said to be self-supporting for any
year in which sufficient payroll taxes are collected to cover that
year’s payments to retirees. A third concept, which combines cer
tain features of each of the others, would require that each indi
vidual’s benefits be actuarially based on his contributions and years
of service but would not require the funding, which, in essence,
means that current contributions would still be available for pay
ment of part or all of current benefits.
The social security system was really conceived under the third
concept, since the system’s designers expected a fairly direct cor
relation between an individual’s retirement benefits and the
amounts of that individual’s contributions. The idea was sold to the
public on that basis, and the government has carefully maintained
this notion of “insurance.” One of the greatest advantages of an
actuarial correlation between contributions and benefits is the dis
cipline it would place on Congress in considering benefit increases.
Unfortunately, Congress has moved our social security system al
most entirely away from this actuarial relationship, even while it
was publicly nurturing the idea that the system is still a federal
insurance program. Without actuarial discipline, Congress has
elected to incorporate an ever increasing share of the federal wel
fare program into the social security retirement system.
There are two important aspects relative to the self-supporting
concept. First, an actuarial relationship between contributions and
benefits would not preclude the use of general revenue funds for
the payment of retirement benefits. In fact, the absence of the
funding, which would be a part of a commercial system, would
require the use of general revenue funds. In essence, the general
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revenue funds would provide the interest factor that would be
necessary to produce the actuarially computed benefits because,
in a very real sense, the government has “borrowed” all of the
retirement contributions. The government would need to invest
the contributions in order to produce actuarial benefits, and, there
fore, general revenues should pay the interest on such borrowing.
It is important to note, however, that the system would use an
actuarially determined amount of general revenue, and this would
in no way destroy or even damage the concept of the retirement
system as an insurance program.
Secondly, Congress apparently intends the present social se
curity retirement system to be self-sustaining as a system, without
the use of general revenue funding. The fact is that income taxes
and social security contributions have been so intermingled on
both the revenue and expenditure sides that today it is almost
impossible to determine whether the retirement system is even
self-supporting as a system. Even ignoring for the moment the
well-publicized shortfall in social security revenues, the selfsupporting nature of social security is probably more fiction than
fact. This policy statement has emphasized that the social security
fund contributes to the general fund by financing a major share of
the federal welfare program. Also, there are both explicit and im
plicit transfers from the social security fund to the general fund
through the general fund’s borrowing activities. The present trust
fund balance is invested in government bonds, which, during pe
riods of rising interest rates, pay substantially below a reasonable
market rate of interest. Also, as was pointed out earlier, there is
an implicit benefit to the general fund in that there is no attempt
to provide an actuarial funding of social security contributions.
There is a substantial further implicit transfer of funds from the
social security system to the general fund in that the employee’s
contributions to the retirement system are not deductible for fed
eral income tax purposes. Thus, for every dollar contributed to the
social security system, the worker is also paying income tax to the
general fund at his highest marginal income tax rate. This double
taxation of contributions is usually excused on the basis that benefits
are not taxable. The double taxation of contributions, however, is
either not offset at all or is offset in a very inequitable fashion by
the exclusion of social security benefits from income taxation. Due
to the zero bracket amount and personal exemptions, the exclusion
is meaningless for anyone whose entire retirement income is from
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social security. Anyone who dies before retirement will have suf
fered the double taxation of contributions but obviously will receive
no benefit from the exclusion. Millions of individuals suffer the
double taxation of benefits at a relatively high marginal rate for
thirty or forty years but enjoy the exclusion at a much lower rate
for a much shorter period of time. In addition to these inequities,
the time value of money indicates that the cost of double taxation
is considerably greater than the much later exclusion benefit.
Benefits also flow in the other direction from the general fund
to the social security system. The refundable earned income credit
was enacted in order to reduce the burden of the FICA tax for the
very-low-wage earners. Thus, workers with dependent children
and incomes below $10,000 contribute to the social security system
but receive a partial or full offset against their income taxes.
It should be obvious that the two systems (general revenue
and social security) have not been kept separate. In fact, the 1978
income tax reductions were justified in part as necessary to at least
partially offset the burden of the increases in social security taxes.
Adjusting one system because of changes in the other intertwines
the two systems and severely damages a true self-supporting
concept.
The Means-Test Concept

A means test may be applied either at the time contributions
are made or at the time benefits are received, although a pure
retirement system would not need the application of a means test
at either stage. The social security retirement system has a form
of means test at both the contribution and benefit stages.
Perhaps the best example of a hidden means test, at the point
of contribution, is contained in the $500 refundable earned income
credit, as amended in 1978.19 While credit is given on the income
tax return, its justification was to relieve low-wage earners with
dependent children of some of the heavy burden of the FICA tax.
If a person had a steady $5,000 salary each year, and if there were
no increases in real wages during the individual’s working years,
the “average indexed monthly wage” would be $416.67. In the
absence of an indexing factor (explained later), this would produce
a retirement benefit of $237.73, giving this person an income re
placement ratio of 57.05 percent ($237.73
$416.67). It should
19. I.R.C. sec. 43.
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be noted that for 1981 the $500 maximum credit exceeds the
$332.50 FICA tax on $5,000 (6.65% x $5,000) by $167.50; thus,
an individual with only $5,000 in annual wage income is, in effect,
relieved of the entire employee FICA tax plus $167.50 of income
tax and still retains all of the heavily weighted benefits for lowincome wage earners. The aggregate effect is that no tax has been
paid; thus there can be no earned retirement benefits, only welfare.
This may be most desirable for low-income wage earners, but it
should be recognized that their social security benefits are welfare,
funded by a payroll tax on other workers, not a paid-for retirement
package.
As discussed elsewhere in this study, on the benefits side there
is a very real means test applied through the variable replacement
ratio, which gives heavily weighted benefits to lower-income
workers.
The Benefit Structure

In articles and congressional testimony, many persons have
restricted most of their recommendations to the revenue side of
the system. With the tremendous growth in revenues, however,
it appears that most of the system’s problems really involve the
benefit side. Benefits have increased faster than revenues, even
though revenues have risen faster than the CPI.
Before presenting benefit structure recommendations for
changing the retirement system, we shall review both the pre-1979
and the post-1978 computation schemes and the effects of signif
icant amendments in 1972.
The Pre-1979 Benefit Formula

Except when the minimum benefit rules apply, retirement
benefits are based on the computation of an average monthly tax
able wage. For years prior to 1979, this usually covered only the
nineteen highest years of taxable wages earned since 1951. (Starting
in 1979, the number of years included increase each year.) Once
the average monthly taxable wage for years prior to 1979 was de
termined, it was stratified into seven predetermined layers, to
which specified benefit percentages were then applied in calcu
lating the primary insurance amount (PIA). The benefit percent
ages, as of June 1977, varied from 145.90 percent on the lowest
stratum to 24.34 percent on the highest. The percentages, how-
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ever, did not decrease uniformly, as one might have expected them
to do. In fact, they varied somewhat irrationally, with the rate
declining through the first three strata and then increasing for the
fourth layer, followed by decreases through the subsequent strata.
In addition, the layers or strata of the average monthly taxable
wage were not equal; they varied in an irregular pattern from $290
to $100. This is demonstrated in the table below, where the average
benefit percentage is 46.42 percent ($638.28 ÷ $1,375).
Practically speaking, it was not possible for an individual in
1977 to receive the indicated maximum benefit of $638.28. As
Effective Benefit Table as of June 1977
Strata of Average
Monthly Taxable Wage
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Total

$

110
290
150
100
100
250
375**

Percent*

Average Monthly
Benefit or Primary
Insurance Amount***

145.90
53.06
49.58
58.30
32.42
27.02
24.34

$160.49
153.87
74.37
58.30
32.42
67.55
91.28
$638.28

$ 1,375

x 12
Total taxable
wages in
1977
$16,500
*Each percentage increased 5.9 percent over the previous year, when the highest percentage
was 137.77 and the lowest percentage was 22.98.
**Increased $100 over the previous year. When this $100 is multiplied by twelve months,
it equals the $1,200 increase in taxable wages, or the increase from $15,300 for 1976 to
$16,500 for 1977. For 1978 this amount increased to $17,700.
***T h e 1977 benefit formula was selected so that the effects of the automatic increases in
both the monthly taxable wage base and the percentage figure could be reflected.
Note: The increases in benefit percentages (based on CPI) and in taxable wages (based on
increases in average wages) are the results of the 1972 amendments and result in a double
adjustment for inflation for current workers.
Source: U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administra
tion, Social Security Bulletin— Annual Statistical Supplement, 1974, p. 19, and U.S., Con
gress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Staff Data and Materials Relating to Social Security
Financing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 5.
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shown above, that maximum would require an average taxable
wage of $16,500 per year, and, for all years prior to 1977, the
maximum taxable amount was less than $16,500. Thus, no indi
vidual retiring in 1977 had an average monthly taxable wage equal
ling $1,375. On an average monthly taxable wage of $687.50 (onehalf of the maximum), the benefit would be $459.19 ($110 x
145.90% + $290 X 53.06% + $150 X 49.58% + $100 x 58.3%
+ $37.50 X 32.42%). If an average monthly taxable wage of the
full $1,375 were possible, the second $687.50 of wages would have
generated an additional benefit of only $179.09 [($100 — $37.50)
X 32.42% + $250 x 27.02% + $375 x 24.34%] or $638.28 $459.19. This is about 39 percent of the benefit generated by the
first half of taxable wages.
Significant 1972 Am endm ents

Two important changes were made in the benefit structure in
1972. Under the first, benefits are adjusted automatically for in
creases of 3 percent or more in the CPI. This was the cause of the
5.9 percent increase in the benefit percentage noted in the table.
For 1979 the increase was 9.9 percent, and for 1980 the increase
is for 14.3 percent. Under the second change, there is an automatic
increase in the maximum taxable wage (to the nearest $300 mul
tiple) as average taxable wages rise (based on taxable wages of the
first quarters of the two prior years). This automatic increase is also
reflected in the table as an increase in the maximum taxable wage
base fr om $15,300 to $16,500 ($17,700 as of January 1, 1978).
While automatic adjustments due to changes in the CPI are
desirable, the dual benefit was not justified for many current work
ers. Wages rise in response to inflation, and as taxable wages in
crease, the related future social security benefits also expand.
Then, when the benefit percentages also increased in response to
the CPI, there was a dual benefit. This was discussed thoroughly
by many persons, and suggestions were made for uncoupling this
unintended dual benefit.20 James B. Cardwell stated
The trustees note that about half of the long-term financing deficit
can be eliminated by correcting the overindexing of benefits that
20. See Colin D. Campbell, Over-Indexed Benefits—The Decoupling Proposals
fo r Social Security, and Robert S. Kaplan, Financial Crises in the Social Security
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arises from the 1972 legislation creating automatic cost-of-living in
creases. The overindexing has the long-range effect of raising social
security benefits to levels at which they would replace a far greater
percentage of a worker’s final earnings than they now do. In some
cases, future benefits would even exceed pre-retirement earnings.

Decoupling or stabilization of replacement ratios was a significant
part of the Social Security Amendments of 1977.
The Post-1978 Benefit Formula

Starting January 1, 1979, the seven-strata formula was replaced
by one using only three strata. For 1979 these strata were sched
uled as follows:23
Benefit
Percentage

Averaged Indexed
Monthly Earnings

First
Next
Excess over

90
32
15

$180
905
1,085

Thus, the new three-strata formula removed the illogical increase
in the benefit percentage in the fourth stratum of the pre-1979
formula, and it also reduced the benefit percentage for the first
stratum to below 100 percent (permanently for current workers
and temporarily for retirees). The new structure, with initial benefit
percentages ranging from 90 percent down to 15 percent, does
nothing to improve the logical actuarial relationship between total
contributions and benefits received.

System. Both are 1976 Domestic Affairs Studies of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. See also 1976 Annual
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 118; and Reports of the Advisory Coun
cil on Social Security, as reprinted in the B.N.A. Daily Report fo r Executives
Special Supplement (March 7, 1975), pp. 8-10.
21. “Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell, Commissioner of Social Security”
(Press briefing May 24, 1976, on reports of the trustees of the social security trust
funds), B.N.A. no. 101 (May 24, 1976), p. X-1.
22. For an analysis of the 1977 changes, see Colin D. Campbell, The 1977
Amendments to the Social Security Act (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978).
23. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-216, sec. 201(a).
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The new formula is largely a response to the need for decou
pling. Benefits are now based on average indexed monthly earn
ings. To be indexed, each prior year’s taxable wage is multiplied
by the ratio of the average covered wages of all workers for “the
year” (two years before the worker reached age 62) to the average
covered wages of all workers in the year being indexed. For ex
ample, if the average covered wages were $6,000 in 1960 and
$18,000 two years before the retiring worker reached age 62, and
if he had covered wages of $5,000 in 1960 (the year being indexed),
the $5,000 would be increased to $15,000 for purposes of calculating
the average indexed monthly earnings. Thus, as wages rise each
year, the average indexed monthly earnings for each past year will
also rise. (This increases future benefits but does not increase the
amount contributed.)
In addition, as covered wages rise, the amounts in the three
strata will also increase. For example, if covered wages increase
10 percent, the three strata for the following year would be in
creased by 10 percent. This was done so that persons would not
be pushed into higher strata, where the benefit percentages are
lower.
Thus, the strata can change annually for current workers while
the benefit percentages remain unchanged. The average indexed
monthly earnings for retired workers will already have been de
termined and will not change, but their benefit percentages will
increase, as under the 1972 amendments, in response to increases
in the CPI. The separate treatment of current workers and retired
workers resulted from the elimination of the double indexing error
in the 1972 amendments.
In addition to these changes, the maximum taxable wage is
scheduled to increase from $17,700 in 1978 to $29,700 in 1981.
Also, the combined employer and employee rate is scheduled to
increase from 12.1 percent in 1978 to 13.3 percent in 1981. The
combined maximum tax payment will increase from $2,142 to
$3,950. This is an 84.4 percent increase in the maximum tax pay
ment in this three-year period.
The large increase in taxable wage base means increases in
future benefits, which probably will result in less private savings.
The increased benefits, when combined with the expected de
creases in the worker-to-retiree ratio, will also cause the system
to operate in a deficit position at the turn of the century; but this
increase in tax revenue was expected to keep the system solvent
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until then. Unfortunately, with higher-than-anticipated inflation
and unemployment, the social security retirement system appar
ently needs another $25 billion between 1980 and 1984.24 Thus,
this huge tax increase will not get the system through 1984, let
alone through the turn of the century.
Changing Birth Rates and Unem ploym ent

Even with the enacted form of decoupling, there are still longrun problems in funding of social security benefits due to changing
demographics. This is based on assumptions of continued low birth
rates, which will not be completely offset by such other factors as
more women entering the work force, increased numbers of im
migrants, later retirements, and so forth. Regardless of the relative
size of the birth rates in different decades, it is unjust to force one
generation, because they happen to have been born in a period
of declining birth rates, to pay more for their ultimate retirement
than preceding or succeeding generations. If our primary recom
mendation were adopted and benefits were based actuarially on
contributions, this would not present a problem. If such an actuarial
relationship is not established, however, we recommend that any
time the ratio of employed-to-retired falls below a fixed level—
perhaps three workers for each retired person—general fund rev
enues should be used to make up the shortfall.
Unearned benefits, inflation, changing birth rates, and un
employment have been principal causes of the gloomy predictions
for social security. Therefore, we also recommend use of general
revenues to replace the FICA taxes (less reduced benefits) lost due
to excessive unemployment. High unemployment levels provide
no justification for increases in payroll taxes; it seems only fair that
under the current system the loss of social security funds due to
excessive unemployment, say something above 5 percent to 6 per
cent, be made up out of general revenue.
The short-term problem is caused by combined inflation and un
employment. Since social security benefits are, by law, tied to the
Consumer Price Index, the relatively high rates of inflation of the
past two years have caused higher expenditures for social security
benefits than can be supported by the present tax structure, while

24. B.N.A. Daily Report fo r Executives (January 21, 1980), p. LL-1.
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the high levels of unemployment have meant less income to the trust
funds through the payroll tax.25

Potential Impact on Employment

It has long been assumed that only individuals pay taxes. In
other words, all corporate taxes are ultimately borne by individual
investors, suppliers, consumers, or workers. There is no reason to
believe that the employer portion of the social security tax is dif
ferent. When a corporation incurs this cost, it is passed on to
someone. Both the employee’s gross wages (which include the
employees’ share of the FICA tax) and the employer’s share of
FICA are included in the employer’s cost of doing business. Both
are included in the total labor cost and, if the employer is a taxable
entity, are deductible for federal income tax purposes. Thus, if the
employer is a taxable entity, a portion of any FICA tax increase
may be passed on to the government through the tax deduction,
but the remainder must be recovered from customers through
price increases or compensated for by reduced payments to other
parties, such as the stockholders, suppliers, or workers themselves.
If the employer is a nonprofit entity, the entire FICA tax must be
passed on, or levels of operation must be reduced.
This increased cost of labor may normally result in higher wage
demands and prices, as well as increased unemployment. In our
current economic situation, the government should avoid any ad
ditional FICA tax that would tend to spur both unemployment and
inflation. In fact, a reduction in such a tax in stagflation periods
would be highly desirable.
Where business sets prices by a fixed percentage mark-up over costs,
a rise in payroll taxes will raise the prices of goods and services in
the short run because employers will view such tax increases as
increases in their labor costs. Increases in payroll taxes may, there
fore, contribute to inflation. In addition, since the rise in prices
reduces consumer real income, total consumer demand will decline
in real terms and this will reduce production and employment. There
fore, rising payroll taxes may be one source of stagflation, as the
simultaneous presence of inflation and high unemployment has come
to be called.
25. “Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell,” p. 2. This statement was made in
1976, before even more severe increases in inflation and unemployment hit the
system; thus, it is even more true in 1980.
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Computer simulation studies conducted by the staff compared
the eff ect of a rise in employer payroll taxes with an equal increase
in the personal income tax. The simulations showed that the payroll
tax, if shifted forward, reduced employment by twice as much as an
equivalent increase in the personal income tax. Moreover, the payroll
tax increase raises the rate of inflation in the short run, whereas the
income tax increase tends to lower it.26
In the manufacturing sector, there is necessarily a balance
between the cost of equipment and the cost of labor. While it is
absolutely necessary to have capital to employ labor in our econ
omy, it is possible to replace labor with equipment. This substi
tution of one for the other should be made whenever the after-tax
cost of one is lower than that of the other.
There are other areas in our economy, however, that are highly
labor intensive, where substitution of equipment is not really fea
sible; examples include professional firms of attorneys and CPAs
and also nonprofit organizations, such as state and local govern
mental units, hospitals, and universities. The last group, univer
sities, has had great difficulty in coping with inflation, and as a
consequence, their employees’ real wages have been decreasing.
In addition, for any increase in the FICA tax there must be an
equal increase in revenues just to break even, since there is no
income tax benefit from a deduction of the employer’s half of the
FICA tax or from the expected increases in employee wages. Thus,
any increase in social security taxes to meet rising welfare costs
within the social security system is extremely detrimental to the
entire covered nonprofit sector of our economy. It should also be
noted that the use of an income tax credit to reduce employers’
social security costs (one of the Carter administration proposals)
does nothing for the nonprofit sector unless it is a totally refundable
credit.
As stated before, welfare obligations should not be financed
with a regressive payroll tax; welfare is an obligation for general
revenue sources. While we should not put general revenues into
the social security system, we should likewise not put general fund
obligations into that system. But this is exactly what we are doing—
paying for welfare with a regressive tax on labor—and its impli26. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Economic Recovery and
Financing of Social Insurance, committee print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1977), pp. 5-6.
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cations for the well-being of most of our not-for-profit institutions,
state and local governments, and, generally, labor-intensive in
dustries may be very serious.
The Use of General Revenues in the Social Security
Retirement System

If the system we have outlined had always been in existence,
it would seldom need any assistance from the general revenue
fund; there would exist a significant fund from which to pay re
tirement obligations. The system should be self-supporting except
when certain extraneous factors affect either benefits or financing.
1. Because these funds are loaned to general revenue and because
of the pay-as-we-go system of intergenerational transfers, the
payroll tax fund could become insufficient whenever a high
level of unemployment exists for an extended period of time.
In this case, it is recommended that general fund revenues be
used to supplement or, in other words, to make up the shortfall
in current payroll tax revenue. In fact, this could be viewed
not as tapping general revenues but, instead, as the general
fund repayment of borrowed payroll tax revenues if the ben
eficiaries’ payments were based on their contributions.
2. Again, due to the intergenerational transfer system, demo
graphic changes can cause a shortfall in current payroll tax
revenues. Thus, it is recommended that if the ratio of workers
to retired persons falls below a fixed point, for example threeto-one, that the shortfall in payroll tax revenue be made up
from general revenues.
3. Our recommendations would require the general fund to reim
burse the payroll retirement fund for the real rate of return
plus the inflation factor. Since price-level-adjusted total con
tributions require an inflation adjustment plus a real rate of
return, this amount should be charged to the general fund for
its use of these funds even when the Treasury could borrow
at a lesser rate. The appendix contains some examples of our
suggested computation of the price-level-adjusted total
contribution.
Any major reform of the social security system should include
a re-examination of at least two other characteristics of the present
arrangement. From the very inception of social security, contri
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butions have been extracted only from earned income. This was
justified on the assumption that investment income would continue
after retirement. This justification has limited validity. One of the
fundamental concepts of social security has been a forced savings
program under which individuals are expected to provide at least
a basic floor of protection for themselves. This would be better
fulfilled if all income contributed to such “forced savings.” Thus,
if society determines that a certain floor of retirement income,
disability protection, survivorship benefits, and health care is es
sential for every individual, persons with only investment income,
as well as workers, should provide that floor of protection for them
selves. Also, wage earners with some investment income might be
expected to save part of their total income. To the extent that
investment income does continue through periods of disability or
into retirement, it would simply supplement the basic floor of
protection.
Another characteristic of the present system, the benefit re
ductions due to income earned after retirement, has been subjected
to vigorous criticism within Congress and elsewhere. Many people
consider it strange and highly inequitable that retirees who desire
to supplement their social security pensions with part-time em
ployment find those pensions reduced or eliminated when em
ployment income reaches a fairly modest level. For this earned
income to reduce retirement benefits and still be subject to double
taxation (FICA and income tax) does seem to constitute a gross
inequity. An editorial in one of the nation’s largest newspapers
labeled this the “most serious inequity of social security” and sum
marized the widely held popular notion of social security as follows:
Americans perceive social security, for which large sums are extracted
from their paychecks, as the nation’s primary pension plan. They see
it as something they have earned, not as charity. They feel that their
earnings after retirement should not impair their vested interest in
that pension plan.

If our primary recommendation were adopted and benefits
were truly based on contributions, the notion expressed above
would be accurate, and there should be no earnings offset against
those benefits. This is another problem of social security that is
compounded by the fact that substantial welfare has been incor
porated into the social security retirement system. Under our pres
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ent arrangement, which combines earned benefits with welfare,
it is unfair to reduce the earned benefits at any level of income
and unfair to continue the welfare benefits for those with substantial
incomes from any source—earnings or investments.
Even with today’s mixed bag, it would be possible at the time
each individual reaches social security retirement age to compute
the price-level-adjusted total contributions by and for that indi
vidual. Also, the pension justified by that total contribution figure
could be calculated. Earnings after retirement should never reduce
this earned retirement income. However, social security benefits
above this amount (really welfare) should be offset by both earnings
and investment income.
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APPENDIX

Price-Ievel-Adjusted Total Contributions
The following examples show the computation of the total contri
butions from which to calculate monthly retirement benefits for any given
individual under various lengths of working lifetimes and various inflation
rates. In each case, it is assumed that both the employee and the employer
contribute $700 annually to the system and that these amounts earn a
Example 1

-03%

-03%

3%

3%

3%

3%

$11.46388

$26.87037

$47.57542

$75.40126

700

700

700

700

18,809

$ 33,303

$ 52,781

8,025

18,809

33,303

52,781

16,050

$ 37,618

$ 66,606

$ 105,562

Total

$
Equal amount for
employer’s
contribution
Base from which to
calculate retirement
benefits (price-leveladjusted total
contributions)

20
-03%

Inflation rate
Real rate of return

Future value of annuity
of $1 at 3%
Annual employee
retirement
contribution

10

30
-03%

Years of work

$

8,025

$

40

Example 2
Years of work
Inflation rate
Real rate of return
Total
Future value of an
annuity of $1 at 10%
Combined annual
employee/employer
retirement
contribution
Base from which to
calculate retirement
benefits

10

20

30

40

7%
3

7%
3

7%
3

7%
3

10%

10%

10%

10%

$15.93742

$57.27500

$164.4940

$442.5926

1,400

1,400

1,400

1,400

$ 22,312

$ 80,185

$ 230,292

$ 619,630
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real rate of return of 3 percent. These examples are intentionally over
simplified in that they are based on a constant annual contribution and
on uniform rates of inflation.
Because it is progressively more difficult to retain a real rate of return
as inflation increases, we recommend a one-tenth reduction in the real
rate of return (.3 percent) for every full percentage point of inflation up
to 10 percent. Thus, with inflation rates at 10 percent or above, there
would be a zero real rate of return. Reworking example 2 under this
assumption produces the following results.
10

20

30

40

7.0%
3.0

7.0%
3.0

7.0%
3.0

7.0%
3.0

Years of work
Inflation rate
Real rate of return
Adjustment to real rate
of return
Total
Rounded to
Future value of an
annuity of $1 at 8%
Combined annual
employee/employer
retirement
contribution
Base from which to
calculate retirement
benefits

-2 .1

-2 .1

-2 .1

-2 .1

7.9%

7.9%

7.9%

7.9%

8.0%

8.0%

8.0%

8.0%

$14.48656

$45.76196

$113.2832

$259.0565

1,400

1,400

1,400

1,400

$ 20,281

$ 64,067

$ 158,596

$ 362,679
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